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Operations of 1 Canadian 
Infantry Divisional Artillery 
24 August - 22 September 1944 
January 1944 1st Canadian Infantry Division 
reverted to command of I Canadian Corps after 
seven months of campaigning in Sicily and Italy 
under a British Corps. The story of the division's 
resentment toward the level of paperwork foisted 
on them by H.D.G. Crerar's untried corps 
headquarters is legendary. Modern military 
historians assume this rancour is indicative of a 
1914-18 mindset among Second World War 
Canadian senior officers which prevented themfrom 
adapting to the fast-paced nature of modern 
mechanized warfare in the 1940s.1 Ironically, much 
of that "paper-pushing " appears to have contributed 
to the Canadian Army's victories over German forces 
in the great battles of 1944-45. 
Among the most labourious administrative 
chores were the operational narratives and lessons 
learned reports requiring battle participants to 
analyze recent actions and draw conclusions for 
improving combat efficiency. These reports do 
indeed date back to the Great War. Most First World 
War historians agree that such documents were a 
key ingredient to the remarkable success of the 
Canadian Corps in 1915-1918.2 
The following report was prepared by the 1st 
Canadian Divisional Artillery staff in late September 
1944, during the brief pause between the 
breakthrough of the Gothic and Rimini Lines and 
the subsequent pursuit into the Po Valley. In the 
weeks prior to that pause, I Canadian Corps suffered 
their heaviest losses to date against the most 
determined German resistance encountered during 
the Italian Campaign. They also demonstrated 
remarkable military skill and professionalism, and 
won their greatest victories of the entire war. 
Readers may note that the report is tightly 
focussed on exacting every possible ounce of combat 
power out of an already effective organization. 
Continual refinements to the Anglo-Canadian 
system were essential given that Alliedforces in Italy 
usually possessed the barest minimum of resources 
necessary to accomplish their strategic mission of 
preventing German formations from withdrawing 
to more decisive fronts. Similar reports are found 
in the war diaries of all units and formations in the 
Canadian Army in the Second World War. What is 
most significant about this process is the rapidity 
with which recommended improvements were put 
into practice during subsequent operations. 
Lee Windsor 
Notes 
1. J.L Granatstein, The Generals: The Canadian Army's 
Senior Commanders in the Second World War 
(Toronto: 1993), pp. 107-108. 
2. Shane Schreiber, Shock Army of the British Empire: 
The Canadian Corps in the last 100 days of the Great 
War (Westport: 1997). 
UNCLASSIFIED 
Operations of 1 Canadian Infantry Divisional Artillery 
24 August - 22 September 1944 
Commander, Royal Artillery 1st Canadian Infantry Division 
Introduction 
1. During the period 24 August - 22 Sepember 
1944, 1 Cdn Inf Div completed the operation to 
capture RIMINI and t h u s assis ted in securing 
an entry into the PLAINS of LOMBARDY. 
2. At the outset this operation, due to various 
conditions of terrain and anticipated enemy 
strategy, was divided into four phases , which in 
effect, were to form one con t inuous operation: 
Phase I - To assaul t across R METAURO and 
establish br idgeheads and crossings. 
Phase II - To advance from R METAURO to 
R FOGLIA. 
Phase III - To break th rough the GOTHIC 
LINE. 
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PHASE IV - To advance and capture RIMINI. 
Later, as events show, the operation included a 
Phase V. 
3. The role of Artillery, 1 Cdn Inf Div was to 
supply direct support to the division for the 
operation, and to assist in the support of 
operations by flanking formations. 
Phase I 
The Assault Across R METAURO and 
the Establishment of Bridgeheads 
and Crossings 
4. By 24 August 1944, 1 Cdn Inf Div was grouped 
behind a cavalry force of the Polish Corps, 
p repared to conduc t the opera t ion of 
es tabl i sh ing a br idgehead across the R 
METAURO. This was to be done in two stages 
with two brigades each with two battalions up, 
with 1 Canadian Infantry Brigade (1 Cdn Inf Bde) 
right, 2 Cdn Inf Bde left, 3 Cdn Inf Bde in reserve 
and 21 Army Tank Bde Royal Armoured Corps 
(RAC) in support. The first stage was to be a 
silent infantry attack across the R METAURO to 
the VIA FLAMINIA, an ideal start line for the 
second stage. This was to be a co-ordinated two 
brigade attack to the bridgehead objective 
approximately 3000 yards beyond the highway, 
and was to be supported by an intense artillery 
program. 
5. An appreciation for the artillery plan indicated 
the following: 
(a) the ground occupied by the enemy was 
very rugged. 
(b) the terrain on the enemy held side was 
in four distinct ridges, thus lending itself to 
four separate and distinct lines of attack. 
(c) there was an abundance of information 
on known enemy positions and localities. 
Therefore it was considered that a series of 
concentrations and linear targets would most 
sui tably deal with the s i tua t ion . These 
concentrations were in belts 400 to 500 yards 
in depth, and timed to agree with the proposed 
rate of advance of the infantry. A belt of pre-
arranged defensive fire (DF) tasks was drawn 
up to coincide with the outside perimeter of the 
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bridgehead. Flanking neutralization was co-
ord ina ted with the f lanking divis ions . 
Concentrated counter mortar and counter 
battery programs were also incorporated into 
the fire plan. All details were complete and the 
plan was issued at 1200 hours 25 August 1944 
for H-hour at 2359 hours , thus affording 
sufficient time for detailed study by infantry and 
formation commanders. 
6. During the night 23/24 August 1944 regiments 
of the divisional artillery, including 24 Army 
Field Regiment (Self Propelled) (24 A Fd Regt 
(SP)) RA u n d e r command, moved into 
camouflaged positions to support the attack. One 
troop of 2 Canadian Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment 
(2 Cdn LAA Regt) was deployed with each field 
regiment. Batteries from 1 Canadian Anti-Tank 
Regiment (1 Cdn A Tk Regt) were with their 
affiliated brigades. 15 and 111 Cdn A Tk Btys 
were under command to support the armour. 
7. The silent crossing of the R METAURO was 
completely successful. At 2359 hours 25 August 
1944 the artillery program commenced with all 
the artillery resources of 1 Cdn Inf Div. 5 Cdn 
Armd Div, 4 Brit Inf Div and some Polish Artillery 
participating. Control of this fire plan was 
comparatively easy and was maintained at HQ 
RCA. The attack moved forward as scheduled. 
8. By 0615 hours 26 August 1944 the two 
brigades were secure in their bridgehead. 
Crossings had been prepared and the armour 
and supporting arms were moving forward. It 
was later discovered that the enemy had 
commenced withdrawing just prior to H-hour. 
As a result the artillery fire came down on his 
forces in the open, and inflicted terrible 
casualties. 
Phase II 
The Advance from R METAURO 
to R FOGLIA 
9. The task of the division now was to advance 
with all speed to the R FOGLIA, feel out the 
defences of the GOTHIC LINE and, if possible, 
break through before the enemy's prepared 
defences could be completely manned. The two 
leading brigades were ordered out of the 
bridgehead at 0730 hrs 26 August 1944, 3 Cdn 
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Inf Bde still being held in reserve. 
This was carried out by 1 Cdn 
Inf Bde on the right, and 2 Cdn 
Inf Bde on the left. Both advances 
were supported by armour from 
21 Army Tank Bde RAC. 
10. The terrain over which this 
phase was to be conducted, was 
rolling and barren, and afforded 
very little cover. Poor secondary 
narrow road and numerous 
enemy demoli t ions created 
considerable delay in forward 
movement of t ranspor t and 
suppor t ing a r m s . Tanks 
however, were able to move easily 
and freely. A few prominent 
features did, however, lend 
themselves to defence by the 
enemy, but the same features, 
when in our hands, afforded 
excellent observation points. 
11. The role of the artillery in this 
phase could not be clearly 
defined by any set piece fire plan, 
and control of fire was 
decentralized to some extent, in 
order that continuous and rapid 
suppor t might always be 
available as and when required. 
12. Fire plans were numerous, 
spontaneous and simple. Those 
requiring a heavier weight of fire 
t h a n could be adequate ly 
handled by one regiment, or 
requiring the weight of Army 
Group Royal Artillery (AGRA) 
were referred to me. At times fire 
plans requiring the weight of the whole divisional 
artillery or more, were drawn up and controlled 
from my vehicle parked by the side of the road. 
Speed was the essential factor throughout. 
13. Movement of guns requi red close 
consideration. Gun areas were generally chosen 
from a study of aerial photographs. Immediately 
an area was declared safe for recce by my 
forward reps at brigades, recce parties were 
dispatched. Moves were arranged through 
division. Generally regiments were moved 
complete and were located in their new positions 
in a matter of from two to five hours. On 26 
August 1944 I moved all four regiments under 
my command acrosss the R METAURO. On the 
27 August 1944 I moved two, on the 28 August 
1944 the other two, and on the following day all 
four were again moved to a final position for the 
assault on the GOTHIC LINE. Regiments at all 
times were kept as far forward as the speed of 
the infantry advance would permit. 
14. Continuous close support was at all times 
maintained. When a regiment engaged in the 
close support of an attacking brigade was 
73 
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Medium Gun Position by Lawren P. Harris 
ordered to move, it became necessary that some 
other regiment take over its commitment. This 
was done by a regiment not committed, putting 
wireless sets on the frequencies of that which 
was ordered to move. At all times the forward 
observation officers and the infantry could call 
for fire as required. 
15. When not engaged in actual support of the 
advance, harassing fire was emphasized, more 
particularly when we came within range of the 
R FOGLIA. On the night 28 August 1944, 
intel l igence repor ted the enemy to be 
withdrawing his guns and equipment across the 
river. A very heavy harassing fire (HF) program 
covering all river crossings as well as adjacent 
roads and paths of exit from the GOTHIC LINE, 
was drawn up. The fire continued throughout 
the night. The following day an intense HF 
program on known enemy localities and likely 
supply and maintenance routes was started, to 
reach its climax just before H-hour for the attack 
on the GOTHIC LINE. 
16. Artillery liaison for this phase remained as 
it had been originally at the commencement, and 
as it would continue throughout this operation: 
74 
(a) An exchange of liaison officers between 
Artillery 1 Cdn Inf Div, Artillery 1 Cdn Corps, 
1 Cdn AGRA and the Artillery HQs of the 
flanking divisions. 
(b) Within our own formation; one 
Commander Royal Artillery's (CRA's) rep and 
three CO's reps with each brigade; one 
Forward Observation Officer (FOO) with each 
battalion; plus one CO's rep from 1 Cdn 
AGRA with each brigade HQ. This allotment 
was augmented as necessary, from time to 
time but only for short periods. 
Close liaison such as this completely facilitated 
either decentralized or centralized control. 
17. This phase of the operation was completed 
according to plan. 2 Cdn Inf Bde was successful 
in gaining the high ground overlooking R FOGLIA 
and was relieved on the night of 28/29 August 
1944 by 11 Cdn Inf Bde. On the right 1 Cdn Inf 
Bde was consolidated approximately 3000 yards 
this side of the river. The 48th Highlanders of 
Canada later gained the high ground overlooking 
the river. The relief of 1 Cdn Inf Bde by 3 Cdn 
Inf Bde was completed by the morning 30 August 
1944. Throughout this entire phase the advance 
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of the artillery had conformed with the advance 
of the infantry and suppor t was always 
maintained. 
Phase III 
The Break-through the GOTHIC LINE 
and the Pursuit to the R CONCA 
18. 1 Cdn Inf Div was now faced up to the 
GOTHIC LINE with two brigades up, on the right 
3 Cdn Inf Bde, on the left 2 Cdn Inf Bde, in 
reserve 1 Cdn Inf Bde, with 21 Army Tank Bde 
in support. The task of the division now was to 
assault and effect a break-through of the 
GOTHIC LINE; to form a bridgehead across the 
R FOGLIA and then advance as rapidly as 
possible to the R CONCA. This effort coincided 
directly with the task of 5 Cdn Armd Div who 
had taken over the left sector of the divisional 
front as in Phase II. Intermediate objectives were, 
for 1 Cdn Inf Div MONTE LURO (0180), for 5 
Cdn Armd Div TOMBA di PESARO (9979). 
19. The rolling barren terrain continued with 
the feature MONTE LURO completely 
commanding the entire sector, both back to the 
R FOGLIA and forward to the R CONCA. Roads, 
although of a secondary nature, improved as the 
ADRIATIC was approached. Once reached, 
Highway 16, a first class road, would afford an 
all weather supply route through CATTOLICA 
(9886), PESARO (1280) and FANO (2173). 
20. On the night 29/30 Augus 1944, while the 
relief of 1 Cdn Inf Bde was being completed, 3 
Cdn Inf Bde sent out patrols to recce both sides 
of R FOGLIA for crossings, approaches and exits. 
The following day the West Nova Scotia Regiment 
was ordered across the river. After some 
difficulty with mines and machine guns they did 
establish themselves over the river, followed on 
31 August 1944 by the Royal 22e Regiment. 3 
Cdn Inf Bde was thus successful in securing the 
lateral road across the R FOGLIA by morning 1 
September 1944. 
21.2 Cdn Inf Bde was progressing more rapidly 
on the left, and by the night 31 August 1944 was 
approaching POZZO ALTO (026778). This point 
was taken the following morning and the advance 
continued towards MONTE LURO (0117808). 
This feature fell to the Loyal Edmonton Regiment 
on 2 September 1944. 
22. On the right 3 Cdn Inf Bde was now 
conforming with this advance, while still farther 
over the Polish Corps too, were moving through 
the GOTHIC LINE. The GOTHIC LINE defences 
had been breached. 
23. The Royal Canadian Dragoons at this point 
under command 21 Tank Bde were exploiting 
towards the ADRIATIC on the divisional axis. 
During the late afternoon 2 September 1944 they 
reached the sea at a point near the mouth of the 
R CONCA. On the night 2 /3 September 1944 
consolidation of gains was carried out and by 
early morning 3 September 1944 1 Cdn Inf Div 
was firmly faced up to the R CONCA. 
24. Since the beginning of Phase II of this 
operation, intensive artillery research and 
planning had been going on in anticipation of a 
formal set piece attack on the GOTHIC LINE. 
Accurate information on enemy localities and 
movement was gathered daily from, air photo 
interpretation, defence overprints, reports from 
partisans and prisoners of war. This was all 
collated and transcribed on a large mosaic air 
photo at my headquarters . From this was 
deduced an intense counter preparation and 
harassing fire program which was started on the 
morning of 30 August 1944 and which continued 
until cancellation, due to the proximity of our 
own troops. The targets for the fire plan to 
support the anticipated large scale co-ordinated 
attack consisted of various series of linear and 
pinpoint concentrations and were selected from 
this information. The intended fire plan however 
did not progress beyond this point. However 
these selected targets were of great value to both 
myself and my reps in affording an abundance 
of positive targets for close suppor t and 
impromptu fire plans. 
25. As a result of the unexpected break-through, 
the artillery supplied close support rather than 
predic ted set piece fire p lan suppor t . 
Opportunity shoots were frequent. These shoots 
varied in size from troop targets to a "V" target 
on GABICCE (0186) during the afternoon of 2 
Sep tember 1944. We des igned a very 
concentrated impromptu fire plan in support of 
the Loyal Edmonton Regiment's attack on 
MONTE LURO (017808). This was a series of 
heavy concentration on a time program by field, 
medium and heavy guns. The program was fired 
and remained on call as long as it was required. 
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26. Much movement and speed of movement was 
again essential in supplying continuous support. 
Two field regiments were moved forward three 
times, one field regiment twice, the SP regiment 
twice, and one medium regiment was deployed, 
all within the short period of the advance. 
Continuous support was maintained at all times. 
27. Harassing fire varied from the violent type 
of the counter preparation program to practically 
nil in the latter stages of this phase, due to the 
gradual decrease in the supply of detailed 
information on known enemy localities, and also 
due to the fact that the rapid movement of 
regiments would not permit as great a weight of 
artillery to be used. 
28. As the battle moved more rapidly, 24 Fd Regt 
(SP) RA was placed under command 21 Tank 
Brigade. 5 Cdn Med Regt from 1 Cdn AGRA and 
an Assistant Counter Battery Staff from 1 Cdn 
Corps were placed under my command. Thus I 
was afforded the support of a counter battery 
staff and a med regt should CBO and AGRA drop 
too far behind. The tank brigade was afforded 
the support of a field regiment should divisional 
control of fire prove impracticable. 
29. The breaching of the GOTHIC LINE and the 
advance to the R CONCA had been achieved with 
greater ease than anticipated. Phase III in all 
respects had been a complete success. 
Phase IV 
The Advance to the R MARANO 
30. To conform with the original plan of the 
operation, 1 Cdn Inf Div was to attack on the 
right sector of the Corps front along the axis 
Highway 16 and capture RIMINI (8597). The first 
stage of this attack was to be the establishment 
of a bridgehead over the R CONCA and to 
continue the advance to the R MARANO and then 
to continue along the coastal axis. This plan was 
to be executed initially by the gaining of the 
bridgehead by the Royal Canadian Dragoons, 
later to be taken over by the Royal Canadian 
Regiment. Then the remainder of 1 Cdn Inf Bde 
were to pass through and continue the advance 
to the R MARANO. 
31. The terrain over which this advance was to 
take place, on initial study, might appear to be 
far less difficult to traverse than that over which 
we had just passed. On closer examination 
however it was found to be tactically far more 
difficult t h a n any ground previously 
encountered. Ahead, and within the divisional 
boundary, was the rolling ground across the R 
CONCA for approximately 5000 yards following 
which it gently sloped to the R MARANO - a 
distance of approximately another 5000 yards. 
The latter was entirely barren and completely 
under observation from both the SAN LORENZO 
- SAN MARTINO feature on the opposite side of 
the R MARANO. and the SAN FORTUNATO 
feature which entirely commanded observation 
of the entire divisional front. These two features 
were separated by still another river - the R 
AUSA. The axis although not rugged was most 
difficult. 
32. The high and rugged hills on the left to which 
our flanking Corps (5 Corps) had been unable 
to penetrate, afforded complete observation of 
our front at all times. It was apparent, before 
this phase had been long under way, that the 
completion of our task would be most difficult 
unless 5 Corps attacked first and secured the 
high ground on their front. 
33. In this respect it was found necessary to 
reorganize the plan for both 5 British Corps and 
1 Cdn Corps. The plan was revised to include 
another phase for 1 Cdn Corps, plus a containing 
action to be included in this phase. While 5 
Corps advanced on our left considerable 
regrouping of our forces was carried out. 
34. On the night of 2/3 September 1944 the Royal 
Canadian Dragoons had pushed .across the R 
CONCA forming a bridgehead into which 
followed the Royal Canadian Regiment and later 
the remainder of 1 Cdn Inf Bde. The brigade 
advanced out of the bridgehead towards the R 
MARANO against very heavy opposition. The 
advance continued on the left to higher ground 
on this side of the river, but on the right was 
stopped before SAN LORENZO (904913) was 
reached. The Royal Canad ian Dragoons 
continued along the coast as far as RICCIONE 
(923904). Progress was slow and no outstanding 
advances were made. 3 Cdn Inf Bde was moved 
across the R CONCA in rear of 1 Cdn Inf Bde on 
9 September 1944 and thence advanced westerly 
approximately two to three thousand yards. At 
this point the division consolidated on a line 
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"Auster III, Air Observation Post, Advanced Landing Ground" by Lawren P. Harris 
Near Ceprano, on a field formerly used as a German anti-aircraft site, Auster III planes of "A" Flight, 657 Air 
Observation Squadron, RAF during operations in support of First Canadian Corps. 
904912-893902 preparatory to continuation of 
the operation as outlined in the revised Corps 
plan. 
35. The entire resources of the divisional artillery 
were placed at the disposal of 1 Cdn Inf Bde for 
this advance. Although on different occasions 
impromptu fire plans were conducted, both from 
brigade and division, nothing of a set piece 
nature was produced. In general the support 
afforded flexibility; and centralization of control 
where it could best be controlled was my aim. 
36. The Air Observation Post at this time, and 
from this time, became more valuable with each 
succeeding day. Primarily it was a source of 
information and secondly it proved almost the 
only means by which observed shooting could 
be carried out. The ground afforded no 
observation that could in any way approach that 
made possible by the Air Observation Post. In 
addition to these normal roles however a 
diversion was supplied to these flying gunners. 
The navy provided destroyers and AGRA 
provided 7.2-inch guns with which they 
conducted many observed destructive shoots. 
Truly in this and the succeeding phase of the 
operations the Air Observation Post became the 
"eyes of the Artillery." 
37. The positions which the enemy had chosen 
to defend proved almost entirely to be strongly 
constructed Italian houses. Field and medium 
concentrations proved of little value in silencing 
or destroying these positions. The heavy FOOs 
together with the Air Observation Post were 
despatched to deal with them. A systematic 
program of destruction was commenced. The 
village of SAN LORENZO in STRADA (904913) 
was almost completely reduced to rubble. 
38. From the continuous artillery intelligence 
data collated at my headquarters, as described 
in para 24., a heavy harassing program was 
maintained throughout this phase. A few 
different types of fire were also employed:-
77 
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(a) The dummy fire plan, ten minutes in 
length on targets chosen by ourselves, but 
with a co-ordinated timing throughout the 
two Corps front. 
(b) The map square type of HF, consisting of 
one round on selected targets, in all map 
squares possible, every seven minutes. 
Included also as HF might be the Counter Battery 
programmes which were continuous throughout 
this period and of which more detailed account 
will be provided by RCA 1 Cdn Corps. 
39. The enemy, during this phase, produced his 
most effective Counter Battery weapon - lurking 
night bombers. The gun areas were bombed and 
strafed on five different n igh t s . S t rong 
representations were submitted in order that our 
LAA Regt be permitted to fire on the occasions 
of their visits. Permission was finally granted but 
only when our own night fighters were not 
affording protection. On occasions when firing 
was permi t ted , from a point of view of 
destruction, the guns were of little value, but 
from a point of view of harassing fire they did 
force the enemy to approach from higher levels 
and bomb less accurately. Morally they were of 
the highest value both to the LAA gunner who 
was firing his guns, and to the field gunner who 
was being protected. 
40. The division was now regrouped and poised 
to go on. The divisional artillery was bolstered 
by the addition of one regiment of Greek artillery 
and three field plus one LAA Regt from 2 New 
Zealand (NZ) Armd Div which came under 
command 1 Cdn Inf Div 11 September 1944. 
Regiments as necessary had been moved 
forward. We were ready to support the next 
phase. 
Phase V 
The Crossing of the R MARANO 
The Battles for SAN LORENZO and 
SAN FORTUNATO Features 
The Capture of RIMINI 
41. The stage was set and now the final phase to 
capture RIMINI was about to commence. 
42. On 12 September 1944 the two corps 
offensive was launched starting with 5 Brit Corps 
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on the left supported by our three regiments of 
NZ Arty. On 13 September all 1 Cdn Div Arty 
groups supported the attack of 5 Cdn Armd Div 
on the ridge no r th of CORIANO (8787) 
subsequent to clearing the town proper. 
43. At 1430 hours 14 Sep, 3 Cdn Inf Bde, with 
12 Royal Tank Regt, started the divisional 
advance up the left side of the divisional sector. 
On the right 3 Greek Mountain Bde continued 
the exertion of pressure along the coast in the 
direction of RIMINI Airfield, and RIMINI. The 3 
Cdn Inf Bde attack was put in across the R 
MARANO against the feature SAN LORENZO 
(862918) - SAN MARTINO (861935). By 1600 
hours on 15 September, all but the right edge of 
this feature was in our hands. In the meantime 
1 Cdn Inf Bde, less one battalion placed under 
command 3 Cdn Inf Bde, had crossed the R 
MARANO behind 3 Cdn Inf Bde and were coming 
up on their right in a flanking movement to cut 
Highway 16 above the RIMINI Airfield (8893). 
The leading battalion of 1 Cdn Inf Bde was 
ordered to assist in the battle for SAN MARTINO. 
Opposition on this right sector had stiffened. 3 
Greek Mountain Bde in the meantime had 
started to advance and by the evening of 15 
September the R MARANO had been cleared. 
Their advance then continued to the area 
immediately west of the airfield. 2 Cdn Inf Bde 
was brought forward then to assist in clearing 
this feature and thence to push through 3 Cdn 
Inf Bde bridgehead across R AUSA for the attack 
on the SAN FORTUNATO (8294) feature. This 
attack was carried out by both 2 and 3 Cdn Inf 
Bdes and by afternoon of 20 September this 
feature was in our hands. The following two days, 
prior to the control of our sector passing to 2 
NZ Div was spent in routine mopping up, and 
es tab l i sh ing a br idgehead across the R 
MARECCHIA. 
44. The artillery support for this phase divided 
itself into stages to coincide with those of the 
infantry attacks:-
(a) Support, by a detailed fire plan, of the 
attack on the SAN LORENZO feature. 
(b) A detailed fire plan on call for the 1 Cdn 
Inf Bde right hook. 
(c) A fully planned and co-ordinated fire plan 
for the assault of the SAN FORTUNATO 
feature. 
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Night artillery shoot 
(d) A smaller fire plan on call for the 
exploi tat ion and cross ing of the R 
MARECCHIA. 
These were the anticipated requirements of the 
set piece fire plans for supporting the capture 
of RIMINI. However they do not include the 
numerous impromptu fire plans fired for 
bat ta l ions or bdes , and which were not 
previously anticipated. 
45. The set piece fire plans utilized to the fullest 
the great weight of artillery in support of 1 Cdn 
Corps. A very high percentage of the 1301 
rounds per gun expenditure of the divisional 
artillery for this period, was fired on these set 
piece programs. These plans, except in the case 
of (c) above, consisted of very carefully chosen 
concentrations and linear targets, so arranged 
in belts that portions could be stopped, paused, 
brought back or refired on call. It was always 
intended that the infantry be afforded the 
opportunity of being able to have the fire when 
they desired it and where they desired it. In this 
regard however very careful control was 
necessary at my headquarters. This control was 
maintained throughout and requests for fire 
were answered by the greatest weight of guns 
available in the shortest time possible. 
46. The fire plan mentioned in para (c) above, 
differed however, in that it consisted of a series 
of linear targets in lanes, with one lane 
supporting each attacking battalion. These linear 
targets lifted in groups, as in a barrage, so that 
the infantry during their advance were able to 
control each lift as required, thus always 
maintaining a wall of fire in front of them. This 
fire plan was originally to have lasted two hours. 
Actually it was fired, stopped, brought back, 
paused and repeated during a period of almost 
six hours, as that was the time required for the 
infantry to secure their objectives. 
47. Impromptu fire plans were far too numerous 
to record. They were fired to assist the infantry 
to start lines for set piece attacks. They were 
fired on outs tanding points of resistance 
requiring added effort. They were fired once the 
objective had been attained and regrouping was 
necessary. These short term, short notice fire 
plans were a very important feature of the 
artillery support of this phase, and required at 
all times a detailed knowledge of the ever 
changing enemy situation. This was maintained 
as outlined previously. 
48. Almost at all times, During the daylight 
throughout this period smoke was used to 
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screen the movement of our infantry and the 
infantry of our flanking formations. These were 
generally predicted smoke screens usually 
employing a regiment at a time. Observation and 
adjus tment were carried out by the Air 
Observation Post and results were excellent. 
Both coloured smoke and smoke lines were fired 
by our artillery as bombing aids in the concerted 
bomber efforts throughout this phase. Smoke 
was recognized once again to be a definite and 
valuable form of artillery support. 
49. Movement for this battle was confined to one 
move forward to facilitate support for the attacks 
on SAN FORTUNATO feature and one further 
move to facilitate support of the exploitation to 
the R MARECCHIA. Movement was not a 
problem but good gun areas were. The areas for 
all the regiments could at best be termed fair. 
Flash cover and protection for gun areas was 
not available and until the final feature was 
taken, it was almost impossible to escape 
observation by the enemy. 
50. On 20 September NZ Arty passed from 
under command to in Support of 1 Cdn Inf Div. 
The PPCLI worked their way down to and over 
the R MARECCHIA. 3 Greek Mountain Bde 
entered and captured RIMINI. On 21 September 
the bridgehead was complete and 2 NZ Div 
commenced the take-over from 1 Cdn Inf Div. 
This was completed by the 22 September. 
51. RIMINI had been taken and the operation 
was completed. 
NOTE: Prevalent throughout this operation was 
an item which could not be isolated to any 
particular phase, the offensive utilization of anti-
tank guns. 6-pounders, 17-pounders and M-10s 
were all used extensively in this role. They were 
brought well forward to destroy houses and 
fortifications as well as enemy tanks. Most anti-
tank guns fired more high explosive (HE) than 
armour-piercing (AP) ammunition. They greatly 
assisted as close support weapons, the infantry 
or tanks whom they were supporting. No doubt 
similar occasions 
will ar ise in the 
future when once 
again their role will 
be offensive rather 
than defensive. 
Staff from 3rd Canadian 
Infantry Brigade plan 
operations in Italy. 
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